From both practical and theoretical perspectives, improved public sector performance has been a major preoccupation of policymakers, managers, and analysts in countries around the world. Performance improvement initiatives have a long history as elements of public sector reform in industrialized countries, and a large literature has examined performance-based reforms, measurement, and management (see, for example, Bouckaert 1992 , Kettl et al. 2006 .
Beyond the industrialized world, such reforms have been promoted by international donor agencies both as remedies for weak public sector performance in developing countries (OECD 2005) , and more recently as mechanisms to assure concrete results from development assistance (Savedoff 2011) .
Performance-based initiatives are commonly advocated as a remedy for service delivery failures, including weaknesses in service quantity and quality, responsiveness, and accountability. While there is enthusiasm in many quarters for such initiatives, definitions that clarify their conceptual boundaries are often vague, and the empirical evidence base for their effectiveness is mixed. This paper briefly reviews current thinking regarding service delivery improvement, and identifies several pathways to improved performance. We explore how these performance improvement pathways seek to increase service quantity and quality, raise utilization and access, and improve provider responsiveness and accountability (Brinkerhoff 2005) . We examine the pathways Indonesia, a country with a rich experience with public sector reforms and service delivery improvement, has pursued. We then summarize the most recent donor-funded initiative aimed at service delivery improvement, the Kinerja project. Indonesia's experience sheds particular light on the institutional and political complexities of performancebased initiatives. We close with a discussion of the lessons and implications of the Indonesian experience for service delivery performance improvement in other settings.
Diagnosing service provision problems
Political science, public policy, and public administration discourses are replete with diagnoses of public sector service provision problems and recommendations for solving them, far too numerous and diverse to summarize here. All of these discourses are fundamentally concerned with the nature of the relationships among politicians and policymakers, service managers and providers, and citizens and service users. The classic politics-administration dichotomy saw public managers and service providers as faithful translators of policies crafted by politicians into programs and outputs to achieve policy objectives desired by voters. Over a century of academic analysis, normative discussion, and empirical investigation has fed debates on the validity and the reality of the dichotomy as representing an oversimplified and/or mythical vision of public administration (see Svara 2001) . According to some, its inherent principal-agent model of mutual high trust led in practice to the rise of the administrative state, bloated government, and unaccountable public sector employees.
The predominant perspective on these relationships today is most clearly represented in the New Public Management (now no longer new, having emerged in the 1980s), which proposes a view of public management and service delivery organizations as -a chain of lowtrust principal-agent relationships…, a network of contracts linking incentives to performance‖ (Dunleavy and Hood 1994, 9) . NPM embodies both an ideology that values limited government and a practical reform agenda intended to transform public sector performance through the application of market mechanisms (see, for example, Ferlie et al. 1996) . NPM principles and practices have been extensively prescribed and implemented as remedies for public sector performance weaknesses in developing countries, both as accompaniments to IMF and World Bank structural adjustment and as other donor-supported public sector reforms (see Batley and Larbi 2004 , Manning 2001 , OECD 2005 .
Directly targeting service delivery, the World Bank applied the principal-agent framework to pro-poor service delivery in a widely cited report that elaborates an accountability triangle connecting citizens/clients to politicians and policymakers, politicians/policymakers to service providers, and service providers to citizens/clients (World Bank 2004) . The three sides of the accountability triangle represent interlocking and complementary principal-agent relations that constitute a service delivery accountability chain. A direct service delivery chain between citizens/clients and providers, where the former exercise power through transactions and monitoring over the latter, constitutes the short accountability route. When the chain involves state actors-politicians and policymakers respond to citizens/clients' voice by designing and implementing management and oversight systems to signal and control providers-this is the long route to accountable service delivery. When these chains function effectively, citizens/clients receive the services they want and need, and both providers and politicians/policymakers are accountable and responsive. The report offers a review of service delivery experience, exploring each principal-agent relationship, much of which applies NPM approaches and tool.
Current pathways to improved service delivery reflect the legacy of NPM and the predominant impact of the principal-agent perspective on diagnosing performance issues and designing measures to addressing them. Today's global economic crisis has renewed the drive for public performance improvement and NPM-inspired reforms not just in the developing world, but in industrialized countries as well. Our brief, and of necessity oversimplified, review below highlights how this perspective and the accountability triangle shape pathways to improved performance. co-production. This latter pathway can include performance-based payment to service users intended to stimulate demand, for example, in the form of vouchers.
Several caveats are in order. First, we make no claim that our list of pathways is exhaustive. Second, real-world applications incorporate multiple pathways. Rarely is there simply a single route to improved service delivery, although international donor assistance may concentrate on one or another pathway more than others. Third, an important question, beyond the scope of this paper, is which combinations of pathways work best and are cost-effective under which circumstances to improve service delivery?
Decentralization
Decentralization is a major pathway to improved service delivery, widely argued to enable performance gains by moving government closer to the people it serves.
1 In terms of the principal-agent accountability triangle, decentralization creates additional subnational nodes of state actors, and devolves service delivery to local entities (public, non-profit, or private) thereby shortening the long route to accountability.
2
Major analytic streams in the extensive literature focus on how decentralization improves allocative efficiency through matching services with citizen preferences, increases service production efficiency and cost recovery, and aligns resources with service delivery responsibilities through various combinations of intergovernmental transfers and own-source revenues (see, for example, the review in Birner and von Braun 2009). Related streams explore decentralization's impacts on service providers' incentives for accountability, innovation, and equitable distribution, and issues of local elite capture and of corruption (e.g., Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000 , Crook and Manor 1998 , Dillinger 1994 .
1 Decentralization can serve more purposes than just better service delivery; see Eaton et al. (2011) . 2 Some definitions of decentralization include privatization as an explicit variant (see Rondinelli 1981) .
Much analysis has addressed gaps in translating decentralization into practice, and has identified contextual factors that constrain the achievement of decentralization's theorized benefits in developing countries. For example, Azfar et al. (2001) A subset of the decentralization path is granting autonomy to individual service provision facilities. This path has been extensively pursued in health and education, where hospital and school autonomy reforms have devolved responsibility, authority, and revenue generation and expenditure. In some cases, this has meant privatization of public facilities.
Standard-setting
The setting of service-delivery standards, translated into regulations and/or specified in performance contracts, is one route to addressing a common problem with service delivery: lack of clarity regarding the constituent elements of acceptable quality services. Poor quality connects directly to underutilization of services and failure to achieve outcomes. The development of minimum performance standards, or of so-called -best practice‖ standards (i.e., benchmarking)
serves to establish clearer depictions of the elements of performance along with metrics.
Principals can use these to frame expectations and targets for agents, which can be incorporated into administrative and/or legal requirements for service delivery and into specifications for performance contracting. Standards become the metrics that create incentives for agents to improve services (e.g., Rowan 1996) .
Studies offer several caveats regarding this pathway to improved services. These include the temptation for agents to select those service recipients most likely to contribute to achieving the standards for which agents are held accountable (-creaming‖), and the difficulty in crafting short-term measurable standards that are reliably associated with desired long-term outcomes (e.g., Heckman et al. 2002) . Such problems notwithstanding, in most developing countries standard-setting is a commonly employed route to service delivery improvement, frequently driven by planning and/or monitoring and evaluation systems, many of them donor-supported.
A common standard-setting item in the NPM toolkit is the citizen charter, a frequently employed means of clarifying service delivery expectations and specifying standards. Charters can be developed at various levels; for example, for sectoral ministries and departments, or for individual facilities, such as schools or health clinics. In many developing countries, such charters are posted in the public areas of ministries or facilities, thus contributing to the information-flow and transparency pathway discussed below.
Results-based management
This route to improved service delivery involves public organizational systems and procedures that formally combine target-setting, budgeting that links targets to funding, performance measurement and monitoring against targets, and accountability for results. Internal to the organization, managers use the information generated by these systems and procedures to make decisions that lead to improved performance. External to the organization, principals use the information for purposes of oversight, accountability, and directives for reforms. In industrialized countries, results-based management has a long history, beginning with such tools as zero-based and performance-based budgeting, and a variety of legislatively mandated accountability programs (see Dubnick and Frederickson 2011 and NGO monitors are all common means of tracking and verifying performance. These are often found in combination. In principal-agent terms, they all share the common challenge of seeking sufficient information from agents to assure that the intended performance that principals want to achieve is realized. Without reliable and accurate verification of performance, the benefits of PBP will not be realized.
Information flows and transparency
The availability and dissemination of information regarding policies, programs, resource allocations, and results relative to services are the core elements of another pathway to improved service delivery. The good governance agenda prioritizes information flows and transparency as hallmarks of increased accountability and improved governance (Brinkerhoff 2005) . In terms of governance, the state's legal and institutional structures play a role both in creating and supporting this pathway. These include laws and procedures that make information available and transparent, such as freedom of information acts (FOIAs), so-called sunshine legislation that mandates government to disseminate budget and program documents, and procedural requirements for open hearings on matters of concern to citizens.
In terms of improved service delivery, expanded information flows address first the technical dimensions of service delivery by generating the data and knowledge on need, demand, quantity, quality, distribution, and outcomes and impacts required by policymakers, program designers, and service providers. This pathway contributes to better service forecasting, resource allocation, and utilization through mechanisms such as management information systems, results reporting frameworks, and/or participatory planning and budgeting exercises. When applied to service users, the provision of information, for example through targeted social marketing and communication campaigns, can enhance service uptake and utilization rates.
Second, this pathway addresses the information asymmetry problem in principal-agent interactions, which enables increased accountability and better incentives on the part of providers. Expanded information availability and dissemination feed into performance monitoring and the enforcement of standards, whether for contract purposes or for more general oversight. For example, the information in citizen charters helps to clarify what service users can expect from providers, and sets the benchmarks for judging performance. In Rwanda, local governments hold Open House and Accountability days (Journées des Portes Ouvertes), where local officials provide information to citizens, and citizens have a regular opportunity to question them and become informed about district development plans and sectoral services (Brinkerhoff et al. 2009 ). Information availability and dissemination are key to giving effect to the citizen participation pathway.
Citizen participation
This pathway concentrates on the demand-side of service delivery, incorporating voice and demand aggregation (citizen satisfaction surveys), empowerment and collective action (citizen/community monitoring), market power (e.g., vouchers), and service co-production.
Among the best-known examples is Tendler's (1997) widely cited study of participatory health service delivery in the Brazilian state of Ceará, where state health officials set and enforced the standards for hiring and performance of community health workers (which avoided clientelism in hiring), while establishing local structures and procedures that engaged local health service users as active participants in assessing health worker performance. However, citizens' ability to judge performance can limit their contribution to motivating service providers. For example, Banerjee et al. (2006) , in a study in India, find that parents' ability to assess the educational achievements of their children was low.
Citizen report cards and user satisfaction surveys are another mechanism that can serve to
generate information on what kinds of services communities want, and what quality levels they expect. When used as input to results-based management and/or performance contracting, such citizen-based evaluations can provide incentives for responsive and accountable service delivery.
Citizen satisfaction is often taken at face value to directly approximate the objective quality of services, using tools such as citizen report cards and user satisfaction surveys. Research has shown, however, that perceptions of service quality are influenced by a range of factors,
including the overall quality of governance, prior expectations, how equitably services are made available, and the type of service evaluated (Deichmann & Lall 2007 , Van Ryzin 2007 .
The extent to which citizens perceive their local governments to be transparent and responsive to their needs can significantly influence their views on service delivery. In their analysis of citizen responses to dissatisfaction, Lyons and Lowery (1989) show that serviceusers' with low levels of political efficacy -defined as feeling that one can influence government and have officials care about one's opinions -are significantly more likely to respond to unsatisfactory services by disengaging with government (-neglect‖ in their model), rather than actively expressing their dissatisfaction.
Another intervening factor is citizens' prior experiences with services. Through expectancy confirmation, the degree to which current outcomes exceed or fall short of those expectations has been shown to influence current satisfaction (James 2009 , Van Ryzin 2007 . If current service delivery exceeds expectations (positive disconfirmation), citizens' satisfaction will be higher than if the same objective quality were delivered in a context with raised expectations. A study looking at satisfaction with services and trust in government in Iraq noted the effects of citizens' expectations, based on prior service experience, on satisfaction levels with current services ).
Finally, the correlation between users' satisfaction and objective service quality has been shown to vary with the specific service under consideration. User satisfaction may therefore be a more reliable measure of performance for some services than for others. In the United States, empirical analysis has shown close correspondence between citizen satisfaction and objective measures of urban sanitation services, such as street and public space maintenance (Van Ryzin 2007) . In a study in India, Deichmann and Lall (2007) demonstrate that a generally positive relationship holds between household satisfaction with water service and daily duration of water availability in Bangalore. Israel (1987) offers an explanation of which services are more likely to be accurately judged by users: those that have high degrees of specificity. He defines specificity in terms of -the degree to which it is possible to specify the objectives of a particular
[service delivery] activity, the methods for achieving them, and the ways of controlling achievement‖ (1987, 48) along with the extent to which the results of the activity have immediate, identifiable, and targeted effects on service users.
The use of community empowerment mechanisms is a well-recognized means to align service delivery to local needs and preferences. Parents' associations, health committees, and community-based natural resources management arrangements bring communities into partnership with public providers precisely for the purpose of assuring that services meet user needs. The literature on state-society synergies for co-production of services highlights this outcome, as well as the benefits for efficiency and effectiveness (see, for example, Evans 1996).
The empowerment aspect of these co-production partnerships emerges most strongly when the information provision on needs and preferences that feeds into alignment is joined with oversight and accountability.
For example, in the Philippines, a demonstration project on the island of Mindanao established Quality Assurance Partnership Committees in local health facilities explicitly to serve both service quality assurance and citizen empowerment functions (Brinkerhoff 2011) . On the service side, the QAPCs offered facilities feedback on client satisfaction. On the empowerment side, the QAPCs aimed to channel community voice to enhance health service provider responsiveness, oversight, and accountability. Through collaboration and consensus, the QAPCs sought to provide review and problem-solving to identify actions to improve facility services.
Such empowerment mechanisms, in the ideal, lead service providers to pay attention to performance. They serve as sources of demand and capacity not just for efficient service provision but also for performance that is accountable and responsive. Several constraints limit whether citizens can, in practice, fulfill these functions. First is technical expertise; particularly in situations where engaging with service providers calls for technical competence, citizens may face information asymmetries and knowledge barriers. Second, there is some degree of role conflict between citizens as co-producers of services in partnership with providers and as accountability monitors.
Summary
Our rapid review of pathways to improved service delivery has demonstrated the hypothesized benefits of each pathway, noted the major constraints and limitations they face, and provided some country examples. Table 1 offers a summary. The discussion also revealed the connections among the pathways. The decentralization pathway shapes in many cases the institutional and structural landscape upon which other pathways are pursued. Similarly, information flows and transparency support the other pathways, as well as constituting a reform route that is often taken up by reformers in its own right. We now turn to an exploration of Indonesia's experience with these pathways.
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Pathways experience in Indonesia
When the Soeharto regime was swept from power in 1998 due to the combined effects of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and widespread public dissatisfaction spearheaded by student The international donor community mobilized to support Indonesia's transition to democracy and good governance. Public sector reform programs aimed to support the country's ambitious decentralization program, increase administrative efficiency and effectiveness, and reorient the public administration toward responsiveness to its citizens. Numerous initiatives targeted performance improvement in key sectors, such as health and education. The following discussion reviews a selected set of these reforms.
Decentralization
Indonesia embarked on a rapid decentralization program beginning in 1999. Through a series of reforms, the bulk of authority for fiscal and legislative decisions, as well as service delivery, were transferred to the district level.
3 Decentralization has had a significant impact on subnational public expenditure. The World Bank (2006) estimates that 40 percent of public spending is currently the responsibility of subnational governments. As the majority of these resources come from central transfers, the efficiency and effectiveness of the intergovernmental transfer system are critical. While the central government has retained the potential to use budget transfers as incentives for performance, these possible channels for influencing the quality and orientation of service delivery at more local levels have not been used effectively (Buehler 2011 , Ferrazzi 2005 , Lewis & Smoke 2011 .
Fiscal incentives are weak, and their effectiveness is not maximized by national policymakers. For example, general revenue allocations (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU) cover over a third of provincial budgets and two thirds of district budgets, on average, and even larger proportions in some districts, as Table 2 shows. The size of the DAU is partly determined using a fiscal equalization formula and partly calculated to cover the subnational wage bill, without taking into account past years' utilization or existing reserves. In spite of surpluses in many districts, the central government has refrained from varying DAU allocations to encourage districts to invest in service improvements (Lewis & Smoke 2011) . The central government's coverage of the district wage bill 4 also discourages districts from experimenting with different models of service delivery, as overhauling staffing patterns and streamlining wage structures would produce no gains to district budgets (Heywood & Choi 2010 Because the central government imposes few controls on intergovernmental transfers, local officials have wide leeway to decide on spending targets. In health, local discretion on spending targets has resulted in some degree of sub-optimal resource allocation in terms of health priorities. Spending does not always target the health needs of the poor, and local parliamentarians have in some cases favored investment in visible infrastructure in support of increased curative care rather than in prevention (Heywood & Choi 2010) . In Aceh, such spending patterns are reinforced by the power of well-off former members of the armed resistance movement (GAM) who head construction firms to influence budgeting votes in local parliaments, as well as by the desire of local politicians to be associated with visible results of their budgeting decisions (Morgan et al. 2012) .
After transfers are made, district use of sectoral budgets is also largely unmonitored. For example, a study of health services in four districts found that no data were available on how health budgets had been spent. Interviewed doctors reported that although budget allocations had increased since decentralization, the promised funds had failed to materialize. The lack of financial transparency and accountability was evident across the districts studied (Kristiansen & Santoso 2006) . A range of efforts are underway to increase the transparency of district budget allocations, some involving citizen participation through participatory budgeting, budget analysis software, and tools that clarify allocations to service providers (as discussed below regarding the information transparency pathway).
Standard-setting
The Indonesian legal framework for decentralization incorporates minimum service standards (MSS). A year after the launch of its aggressive decentralization program in 1999, the central government introduced MSS for nine sectors: public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, industry and trade, investment, environmental affairs, land affairs, cooperatives and labor affairs. Because the MSS were ill-defined and complex, and the roles of central and local agencies in their implementation conflicted, however, they were often ignored by district service providers who found them overwhelming and confusing (Ferrazzi 2005 , World Bank 2008 , 2010 . 
Results-based management
In Indonesia, the results-based management pathway has been pursued on several fronts. During its short implementation period, the voucher pilot demonstrated -that demandside incentive payment mechanisms using government funding‖ are a logistically feasible way to improve service delivery to the poor in Indonesia (World Bank 2005, 12, 15) . 5 However, the pilot also highlighted the challenges of sustaining performance-based payment, given weak district-level capacity for implementation and weak support at the provincial level (Brenzel et al. 2009 ). The pilot also raised concerns that the increased demand could exceed health system capacity, resulting in overcrowded hospital delivery facilities (Gorter et al. 2003) .
A more recent performance-based financing experiment was carried out by the Dutch non-governmental organization, CORDAID, which has implemented similar programs in Rwanda (Soeters et al. 2006) . Working in two remote, predominantly poor districts on the island of Flores, the project collaborated with provincial, district, and local health officials (as well as with a Jakarta-based private firm) to identify a series of service quantity and quality indicators 
Citizen participation
Involving citizens in service improvements can take many forms. One way is to invite users to assess services through satisfaction surveys and citizen report cards, but as noted above satisfaction ratings can have tenuous relationships with objective indicators of service delivery, as user satisfaction may be colored by a range of factors. In Indonesia, the correlation between indicators of facility quality and satisfaction has been found to vary across services and is much weaker for public schools than for public health facilities (Dasgupta et al. 2009, 27) . In line with these findings, Lewis and Pattinasarany (2008) find that objective indicators are significant predictors of satisfaction with education in 89 districts, but that their overall contribution is small relative to governance and control variables. as well as educational behavior. 10 The indicators were chosen because they were directly within the community's control, but also corresponded to stated national priorities. In the multi-year program, communities are given first-year block grants that they can use for any purpose to improve these indicators. To select interventions, they identify problems and bottlenecks and consult with program facilitators, health and education service providers for information, technical assistance, and coordination between villages for shared services and investments. In subsequent years, villagers are awarded additional funding if they show performance improvements on the twelve specified indicators.
11
An evaluation has shown that performance incentives in the form of community block grants can drive improvements in health service provision. Comparing performance with a -non-incentivized‖ control group revealed that performance-based incentives led to statistically 9 Four prenatal care visits, iron tablets during pregnancy, professionally assisted delivery, two postnatal care visits, complete childhood immunizations, monthly weight increases for infants, weight checks for children under five, biannual vitamin A pills for children under five. 10 Primary and middle school enrollment, monthly primary and middle school attendance ≥ 85%. 11 For program details, see Olken et al. (2011) and http://pnpm-psf.ning.com/page/pnpm-rural .
significant, improved outcomes on the eight health indicators. Encouragingly, performance improvements were larger in villages with low baselines for service delivery (Olken et al. 2011 ).
Many performance-based incentive programs reward providers directly for reaching targets, and some rely on consumers to provide feedback on quality (often through satisfaction surveys) (Meessen et al. 2011) . Given the weaknesses of district financing mechanisms and information systems, and the numerous influences on user satisfaction reports, the standard model is unlikely to work effectively in Indonesia. PNPM Generasi circumvents these obstacles by holding neither providers nor individual households' (and their reports of service quality) responsible for driving performance improvements. Instead, the program relies on villagers collectively, represented by an eleven-member team and village facilitators, to work with providers to improve delivery. Accountability is thus enforced through two sets of relationships.
First, the community holds providers to account for providing additional services that improve the selected indicators. Second, the PNPM program holds the community accountable for improvements, by only rewarding communities that show enhanced outcomes.
In spite of the program's demonstrated effectiveness, it is not a model that can necessarily be applied more generally as it is unlikely to work for all services. In fact, the PNPM Generasi evaluation showed no effect on the selected education indicators (Olken et al. 2011) .
The specific allocations of responsibility for performance improvements set up for PNPM Generasi proved effective for improving selected health service targets, but the distinct institutional constellations and output/outcome characteristics of other services will likely require different arrangements.
In the case of Indonesian public schools, Pradhan et al. (2011) found that community participation could significantly increase test scores through linking school committees with village councils, and also in combination with democratic election of committees. 12 These authors posit that linkages improve outcomes by raising village leaders' and community members' awareness of the school committee and engagement with students by -engender [ing] respect for the school committee in the eyes of the teachers, increas[ing] time household members help their children with homework, and prompt[ing] greater effort by teachers, largely spent outside the classroom‖ (Pradhan et al. 2011, 4) .
At the co-production end of the participation pathway's spectrum, school committees that incorporate parents and other community members are one avenue for citizens to directly contribute to the production of improved educational services. Although the roles and responsibilities of school committees were set out in a 2002 decree, 13 these bodies have not taken on the envisioned tasks of supporting, monitoring, advising, and mediating in schools, instead only signing off on school officials' decisions. One component of the Decentralized Basic Education Project (DBE1) was to strengthen school committee involvement in planning and management, with a long-term goal of improving educational outcomes. After school committee training through DBE1, the proportion of school committee members reporting that they were -active‖ in preparing and implementing school development plans rose to 84% by the end of the project in July 2008 (compared to 13% on average at baseline in December 2005) (Heyward et al. 2011, 8) .
14 At the same time as school committees became more active, financial information was shared much more frequently; over 50% of schools disseminated financial reports in two or 12 In contrast, neither grants to, nor training for, school committees improved learning outcomes. As these programs demonstrate, linking the pathways for citizen participation with transparency through community monitoring (sometimes of specific standards) can improve service delivery. However, the mechanisms chosen for specific forms of service delivery matter greatly for effectiveness. Another concern is about sustainability of improvements. For example, in the DBE1 project, analysis revealed that as school committee activities declined in intensity, so did school officials' efforts at transparency. However, the quality of school development plans has been consistently high over the life of the project, which provides some encouragement that introduced patterns of behavior may persist.
Addressing performance improvement: the Kinerja project
Donor partners continue to work with Indonesian counterparts at both national and subnational levels to pursue the pathways to improved service delivery discussed above. Within each sector, the project works with local governments, civil society, and service providers on specific interventions, chosen for their alignment with national policy priorities and/or demonstrated effectiveness. Kinerja also includes a series of cross-sectoral interventions designed to create incentives for improved local service delivery performance, by giving citizens a more effective voice in public service delivery, supporting performance management systems in local governments, and increasing competition, through benchmarking, competitive awards, and public information (RTI International 2011b).
As summarized in Table 3 , Kinerja interventions focus on a selection of the pathways to improved service delivery. The majority of interventions combine citizen participation, information transparency and dissemination, with a subset also emphasizing standard-setting and results-based management. The selection of pathways reflects the institutional orientation of the project, with its focus on interactions between district government, citizens, and service providers.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
One of the project's challenges, however, is to work with district governments of varying capacity and interest in improving service delivery. All projects face this hurdle, but it is exacerbated by Kinerja's design, which emphasizes quasi-experimental evaluation; project sites were selected at random to enable rigorous comparisons of impact. While this approach has methodological advantages, it has created tensions and delays as provincial government were reluctant to agree to randomized selection of sites. The current quality of governance also varies widely in the selected districts (see Annex). Further, some randomly selected districts have very little interest in improving service delivery (for a host of local political and personal reasons), which directly impedes project implementation. Other districts are interested, but are newly established and have yet to develop the institutional capacity to absorb Kinerja's packages of interventions. These complications may increase the reliance on the citizen participation pathway, in spite of the clear need to strengthen relations between district officials and service providers.
It is also worth noting that Kinerja largely abstains from addressing the larger issue of national-subnational relations that are critical to improving service delivery. Aside from the MSS project component, strengthening the decentralization pathway is beyond the scope of the already broad project. However, as the project progresses, we anticipate that analysis of the Kinerja experience with the other service improvement pathways will yield useful lessons on utility of the pathways as routes to better services and on the conditions under which these pathways lead in that direction.
Implications
This rapid overview of Indonesia's experience with service delivery improvement pathways reveals several emerging lessons regarding the questions of what has been learned about public sector reform, and of where reformers should go, moving forward. We review these according to the performance pathways previously discussed.
Decentralization: performance "superhighway?"
First and foremost is the primacy of the decentralization pathway for service delivery.
Decentralization is perhaps primus inter pares relative to the other pathways in that it strongly influences the prospects for success of the other pathways discussed here. Without decentralized local governments, it is difficult to drive performance reforms top-down from the center when the long route to accountable performance is stretched so far.
As the above discussion highlights, the problematic elements of Indonesia's decentralization, such as the lack of clarity on amounts and timing of intergovernmental transfers, delineation of expectations and responsibilities for services, and information flows detracts from its ability to contribute positively to better services. These problems also impede the workings of other pathways. They are symptomatic of the disconnects in the principal-agent relationships among various levels of government and service providers.
Numerous analyses have warned of the difficulties of -getting it right‖ with decentralization and the dangers of -getting it wrong‖ (e.g. Crook and Manor 1998 , Shah and Thompson 2004 , Devarajan et al. 2009 ). The ambitious nature of Indonesia's decentralization has inevitably led to some missteps along the way, although significant progress has been made.
However, to improve Indonesian services, more must be done to overcome financial, administrative, and political hurdles resulting from the continuing lack of clarity over transfers, responsibilities, and accountabilities between national and sub-national levels of government, as well as with service providers.
Indonesia's experience with the decentralization pathway demonstrates the tension that Ahmad and Brosio (2009) note between local government autonomy and accountability for service delivery in the public interest, which includes delivery in conformance with technical standards. For example, the Indonesian state has a history of delivering free or highly subsidized basic health services through a system of district-level hospitals, complemented by clinics at the sub-district and village levels that focus on preventive care and maternal and child health. With decentralization, however, these services have suffered substantial decline (World Bank 2008 , 2010 . As local officials allocate resources to other uses than health, those basic services are starved into atrophy. Private providers (often state-employed healthcare workers supplementing their meager salaries) have taken on an increasing share of care, particularly to better-off Indonesians who can afford to pay higher fees for improved access and service (Heywood & Choi 2010 , Kristiansen & Santoso 2006 . In the absence of policy clarity regarding national priorities and standards, and effective oversight mechanisms, the service-delivery performance enhancing potential of decentralization is at risk.
Standard-setting: promising but potential unfulfilled
The basic lesson regarding the use of standards for service delivery performance is the need to design them in formats that are understandable for the stakeholders that will employ them and to communicate the standards effectively. The findings of several of the Indonesia studies reviewed converge around the gaps in implementing MSS as an effective pathway to service improvement. The use of standards depends critically upon information systems that enable tracking of the extent to which they are applied. As the education sector experience with the standards cost calculation tool (PBPSAP), the ability to assess costs associated with tracking and meeting standards is important for feasibility and sustainability. Finally, principals need both the capacity and the will to use performance results compared to standards as a criterion, for example, for accreditation, certification, staff promotion, and/or resource allocation. Otherwise, the extent to which this pathway can offer incentives to performance is limited. The Indonesia case highlights the institutional and political constraints to employing this pathway (Ferrazzi 2005 , Buehler 2011 ). However, a critical issue for broader impact and sustainability is how to move from these -islands of effectiveness‖ to institutionalization (see Leonard 2010, McCourt and Bebbington 2007) . PNPM Generasi's results focus at the lowest local level (sub-district and village)
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bypasses the weaker accountability relationships at higher levels of governments. While this is an important element of the program's effectiveness in the short term, it means that the community-based model may not be sustainable in the future. Central government control of the program may be politically difficult to justify in the long term, but unless accountabilities between districts and both providers and communities are strengthened it is unlikely that the performance incentives that PNPM Generasi puts in place will operate as intended. This points to the importance of addressing capacity weaknesses at higher levels of government and of recognizing the political economy dimension, which affects public sector reforms of all stripes (see the concluding remarks below).
Information flows: input to the other pathways
Measuring, monitoring, and enhancing performance all depend upon information. This information needs to be available not simply to service providers and their principals, but to service users as well. The selected examples from Indonesia of efforts to place more information in the hands of local officials and citizens reinforce this lesson. Basic resource tracking and budget analysis tools enable performance comparisons on dimensions such as planned versus actual allocations, planned versus actual spending, distribution/equity of spending, and so on.
Such financial information, along with service delivery output/outcome data, feed into benchmarking, target setting, and monitoring for MSS.
Citizen participation: institutionalizing the benefits, confronting barriers
A lesson emerging from Indonesia regarding citizen participation in improving service delivery performance is that -one size does not fit all.‖ As the various studies summarized above reveal, different approaches to performance-based management reforms are required for different services, depending on citizen capacity to monitor, visibility of service delivery performance, institutional arrangements for service delivery, and other factors (Dasgupta et al. 2009 , Lewis and Pattinasarany 2008 , Olken et al. 2011 . For example, in linking service users to providers, it may make sense to differentiate in terms of where satisfaction surveys have been shown to related to service quality: communities would monitor providers in partnership with sectoral oversight agencies through committees for meeting health targets and similar services where performance is poorly correlated with satisfaction; while satisfaction surveys would be employed for policing and infrastructure, where correlation with performance is high. The PNPM Generasi program is a particularly interesting example of community-based PBP, but as noted above, it has largely bypassed local governments, calling into question its broader institutionalization as part of a national policy to improve service delivery performance.
As many observers have remarked, Indonesia's transition to democratic governance remains a work in progress. Some significant advances have been achieved in engaging citizens in the workings of the state; for example, in some jurisdictions re-energizing the often moribund participatory local planning system of musrenbang, the establishment of local parliaments or DPRDs, and incorporating citizen input into regulations and laws (Antlöv and Wetterberg 2011 , Antlöv et al. 2008 , MacLaren et al. 2011 ). However, the Indonesian public administration retains much of its pre-reformasi orientation that views citizen participation as unwelcome intrusion into the affairs of government (e.g., ADB 2004 , Buehler 2011 . Thus despite evidence that citizen participation can make a difference in service delivery improvement and in increasing government responsiveness and accountability, moving from pilot experiments to policy and routine practice is a long-term reform challenge.
Concluding remarks
In spite of the progress with democratic reforms, Indonesia retains many core features of a fundamentally neopatrimonial state, where entrenched political and economic elites exercise control while operating within an ostensibly Weberian public administration. The case of Indonesia is far from an anomaly. The international good governance agenda notwithstanding, clientelism and patronage are integral to the societal pacts that support state-society relations in most developing countries (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2004) . Various observers have noted the enduring power in Indonesia of old ingrained patterns of elite-dominated patronage politics and pervasive corruption (e.g., Blunt et al. 2012) , and the shallow roots of reformist civil society and the forces for change, which some have referred to as the problem of -floating democrats‖ (Törnquist et al. 2003 ).
The effects of Indonesia's political economy on progress and prospects for the pathways to service delivery performance have been noted throughout the above discussion. The tendency of the current donor fashion for methodologically rigorous evaluation of the outcomes of performance-enhancing interventions has reinforced a focus on the technical components of the interventions divorced from their institutional context. Yet, political economic factors strongly condition whether the experiments supported by international donors will be institutionalized, and indeed whether commitment to better performance is more than simply lip service to the donor-driven good governance agenda. They are of major import for the future of the most significant performance pathway: decentralization (see Lewis and Smoke 2011) .
However, to argue for attention to political economy in considering the prospects for pursuing the pathways to improved service delivery is not automatically to succumb to political economic determinism. Within almost any institutional context, committed leaders can create and/or expand space for change so that reform progress can be advanced (Andrews et al. 2010 , Leonard 2010 . One study of local government performance reforms in Indonesia supports this point; it found that the presence of management commitment was the strongest factor influencing the use by local governments of performance indicators (Akbar 2010) .
We conclude this overview of performance-based public management reforms not with pessimism for Indonesia's prospects, but with realism in recognition of the fact that as there are forces in favor of political patronage and elite dominance, so there are also forces that continue to push for change. For service delivery improvement, we see the most effective level to work at being subnational, to support service provider incentive creation directly and to use citizen participation to push for better monitoring and more responsiveness. Tackling information systems and transparency to generate usable data to link to performance accountability can contribute to the building blocks for service delivery improvement, while reinforcing citizen capacity for voice and empowerment (e.g., SekNas FITRA). Projects like Kinerja are pursuing these routes, and can contribute to building the kind of knowledge that will help to answer not just the question of what works to enhance performance, but also to clarify under what conditions service delivery performance can be improved and sustained. Crosssectoral Budget analysis to measure levels of governance throughout the budget cycle and identify whether local budgets are pro-poor and gender responsive compared to other districts/municipalities (see Table  1 
